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THE RIGHT TO STRIKE OVER SAFETY ISSUES
INTRODUCTION
Section 301(a)' of the Taft-Hartley Act gave the federal courts juris-
diction over suits involving the violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization. This Section has recently been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court as giving the -federal courts the power to enjoin
strikes under certain circumstances where there is a collective bargaining
agreement. 2 This power to enjoin such strikes was limited in the Taft-
Hartley Act, however, by the "saving provision." Section 5023 of the Act
stated that, "the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employ-
ment of such employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under
this Act." The meaning and impact of Section 502 is the topic of this article.
The right to strike over safety issues, referred to in Section 502, arises
in two main situations. First, where the collective bargaining agreement has
an express or implied no-strike clause, the employer may seek to enjoin the
strike4 or seek damages for the strike if it violates the no-strike clause.5
However, if the strike is a valid safety strike within the meaning of Section
502, then Section 502 bars the employer from obtaining an injunction or
damages.
The second major situation in which the right to strike over a safety
issue arises is in unfair labor practice proceedings involving the discharge
of employees. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act" gives to em-
ployees the right to "assist labor organizations, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection. . . ." The courts have held that participation in a valid Sec-
1. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1973).
2. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253
(1970), the Court held that federal courts may enjoin a strike where it was found that:
(1) the collective bargaining agreement contained a mandatory grievance procedure
which covered the dispute out of which the strike arose, (2) that either the employer
was ready and willing to settle the dispute through the grievance procedure or the court
would order him to settle the dispute in this manner, and (3) the ordinary principles
of equity warranted such an injunction (i.e. that the strike will continue, will cause ir-
reparable harm, and the injunction will cause less harm to the union that the continu-
ing strike would cause to the employer).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1973).
4. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
5. For cases upholding the right to sue for damages due to a breach of a no-strike
clause, see Teamsters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) and Furni-
ture Workers v. Colonial Hardware Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1973).
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tion 502 safety strike is one of these protected rights to which Section 7 re-
fers. 7 The National Labor Relations Act also declares it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to either: (1) "interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7"8 or (2) to
hire or fire employees in a discriminatory manner in order to discourage
membership in a labor union. 9 Therefore, the discharge of employees for
participating in a valid Section 502 safety strike would constitute an unfair
labor practice.
Two TESTS: A GOOD FAITH BELIEF OR AN ACTUAL FINDING
OF ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS WORKING CONDITIONS
In interpreting the phrase in section 50210 that the work stoppage was
"in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work . . .",
the courts and the National Labor Relations Board have followed two lines
of reasoning. The first line of reasoning states that, in order to bring such
a strike within activities protected by the Act, one must show that the work
stoppage is based upon a good faith belief that the working conditions are
abnormally dangerous, regardless of whether the conditions are, in fact, ab-
normally dangerous. In a work stoppage over a mine safety issue, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated, "the miners
themselves . . . should make the determination as to what constitutes a
safety hazard."" The second line of reasoning is that it must be shown
that the working conditions which caused the work stoppage were, in fact,
abnormally dangerous. The National Labor Relations Board in Redwing
Carriers, Inc.'2 set forth this interpretation by saying the test should be:
[A]n objective as opposed to a subjective test. What controls is
not the state of mind of the employee or employees concerned,
but whether the actual working conditions shown -to exist by com-
petent evidence might in the circumstances be reasonably consid-
ered 'abnormally dangerous'.
Other Board and court decisions have also supported this latter viewpoint.' 3
7. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492, 495 (3rd Cir.
1964); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 759 (6th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied 357 U.S. 927 (1958), rehearing denied 358 U.S. 858 (1958); and NLRB v.
Southern Silk Mills, 209 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1973).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1973).
10. Id. § 143.
11. United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 469 F.2d 729 (3rd Cir.
1972). Accord, Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159,
1160 (3rd Cir. 1972).
12. 130 NLRB 1208, 1209 (1961), affirmed Teamsters Local No. 79 v. NLRB,
325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
13. NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Const. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964); Stop &
Shop, Inc., 161 NLRB 75 (1966), affirmed Machaby v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 59, (1st Cir.
1967); Myers Industrial Electric, 177 NLRB 817 (1969).
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This dispute as to the meaning of Section 502 of the Act has been put
to rest ,by the very recent United States Supreme Court decision, Gateway
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers 4 which upheld the second line of inter-
pretation. The employer asked that the district court grant an injunction
against a strike which had been caused by a safety dispute. The dispute
arose when the some of the miners discovered that three foremen had been
falsifying -records concerning the air flow in the mine 'by stating the air flow
was adequate when actually it was not. The miners demanded the foremen
be fired. After a short suspension of the foremen they were reinstated,
which caused all the miners to walk off the job. The Third Circuit dissolved
a temporary injunction issued by the district court finding that the miners
had stopped work upon a "good faith concern for safety .. ."15 The Third
Circuit, therefore, felt it necessary to avoid any construction of the collective
bargaining agreement which would imply a no-strike clause which encom-
passed such safety disputes. 6
The Supreme Court found that a good faith belief that the conditions
were abnormally dangerous was not, by itself, sufficient to invoke the
protection of Section 502. The Court held that "objective evidence of
such conditions [must] actually obtain" and that a union seeking to invoke this
defense "must present 'ascertainable, objective evidence supporting its con-
clusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists.' -17 Noting
that the district court conditioned its injunction on the suspension of the -fore-
men in question, it found that any possible dangerous conditions which may
have existed were, therefore, removed.'
Is the requirement that there must in fact have been abnormally dan-
gerous conditions before the courts will protect strikers under Section 502
a wise rule? The dilemma faced by the employees under this rule was
stated by the Eighth Circuit:
[I]f employees 'acting concertedly leave their jobs believing in
good faith abnormally dangerous working conditions prevail, they
run the risk of discharge for engaging in a "strike" in contraven-
tion of a "no-strike" clause in ,their collective bargaining agreement
19
In Gateway the danger was removed when the Court conditioned the grant-
ing of the injunction upon the suspension of the foremen at the time the
14. 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
15. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3rd Cir.
1972).
16. Id. at 1160.
17. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 94 S. Ct. 629, 641 (1974), citing
Judge Rosenn's dissent in the appellate court's decision of this case, 466 F.2d at 1162
(1972).
18. id. at 641.
19. NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Const. Co. 330 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1964).
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injunction was granted, and no employees had been discharged. The situa-
tion is quite different in an unfair labor practice hearing where employees
are discharged for their work stoppage. This rule forces them to either con-
tinue work under conditions which may be abnormally dangerous or stop
work and take the chance that they will lose their jobs with no chance of
a reinstatement order by the National Labor Relations Board, unless it is
found that abnormally dangerous conditions actually prevailed.
A solution to this problem would be to restrict the Gateway rule to in-
junction cases and allow the Board and the courts to apply the good faith
rule to cases involving discharges. However, there is no language in the
Supreme Court's opinion which would lend itself to this interpretation. The
only remaining solution, barring a subsequent overuling of Gateway by the
Supreme Court, is a congressional act amending the wording of Section 502.
If such a change is contemplated, there are several arguments on either side
which would support or weaken the argument for a change to a good faith
rule. The undesirability of making employees choose between taking a se-
rious risk of injury or losing their jobs when they in good faith believed their
working conditions are abnormally dangerous speaks for the good faith rule.
Further, an employee's safety should take precedence over the other con-
cerns involved. The congressional concern for employees safety has already
been shown by the enactment of Section 502, in addition to the recent enact-
ment of several major acts in the area of occupational safety.
20
On the other hand, a good faith rule may be abused because it might
force courts to uphold work stoppages as protected activities whenever the
strikers merely assert there is an abnormally dangerous condition. 21 Also,
there is a strong federal policy in favor of submitting disputes to arbitration
rather than allowing the employees to try and settle them by a strike.22  At
least where a grievance procedure, including arbitration, is available this
may be a good argument. Whether industrial peace through arbitration out-
weighs workers' safety, however, is an issue the Congress should decide.
The courts, however, may guard against the possible abuses suggested by
the first argument that under the good faith rule bare assertions of unsafe
conditions will protect the strikers. The courts may examine whether there
was in fact a -good faith belief that abnormally dangerous conditions existed.
20. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1973); The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-878 (1973).
21. See Judge Rosenn's dissent in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,
466 F.2d 1157 (3rd Cir. 1972).
22. In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582, 583 (1960), the Court felt that if the collective bargaining agreement
contained an arbitration clause, the particular grievance should be submitted to arbi-
tration "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage."
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The courts could examine objective evidence to decide whether reasonable
persons under similar circumstances could have concluded that abnormally
dangerous conditions were prevailing, even if later analysis would show no
such abnormally dangerous condition actually existed.
TowARD A DEFINITION OF ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS WORKING
CONDITIONS
Whether or not the requirement that actual abnormally dangerous
working conditions must be shown is a good rule, it is the law today. There-
fore, a definition of what constitutes abnormally dangerous working condi-
tions is of vital importance. Of course the National Labor Relations Board
or the courts which 'face this question must examine each situation on a case
by case basis as the spectrum of possibilities is too great to file them away
in neat pigeonholes. However, a survey of cases and board decisions which
have faced this issue will be useful to bring out what factors have been held
important in considering what constitutes abnormally dangerous working
conditions.
One important factor is whether the work stoppage was brought about
by purportedly dangerous conditions which were new and not merely con-
ditions which prevailed for some time. This factor was pointed out most
effectively in the National Labor Relations Board decision of Anaconda
Alwninum Co. 23 The decision stated:
Absent the emergence of new factors or circumstances -that change
,the character of the danger, work that is recognized and accepted
by employees 'as inherently dangerous does not become abnor-
mally dangerous merely because employee patience with condi-
,tions ceases. 2
4
Another case 25 examined a work stoppage by construction workers who were
engaged in digging a deep shaft. A number of complaints were made by
the workers concerning water leakage, slippery surfaces and the possibility
of falling objects which might cause the men to fall off a ledge on which
they worked. In finding no abnormally dangerous conditions, the court
pointed out that the men had been working under the same, if not worse,
conditions the prior day when no complaints or work stoppages occured. 26
Another Board decision 27 noted that the breakdown of a ventilation system,
which created a high dust content in the air, was an occurance which had
23. 197 NLRB No. 51, 72 L.C. 31,263 (1972).
24. Id., 72 L.C. at 31,264. The decision went on to say that where the operations
were being carried out in a manner which had been utilized before and that the danger
the employees were concerned with here was a normal one they regularly had faced be-
fore, the danger was merely a normal one and not an abnormal one.
25. NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Const. Co. 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964).
26. Id. at 890, 891.
27. Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 NLRB 473, 474 (1963).
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happened a number of times in the past. Even if the danger is a new one
on the particular job in question, the fact that this danger is regularly faced
by workers on similar jobs elsewhere may mean it is not an abnormally dan-
gerous working condition. 28
A second factor, tied directly to the rationale of the "new danger" rule
examined above, is whether the job is normally a dangerous one. It is com-
mon knowledge that certain types of jobs involve a substantial amount of
danger. Mining, construction work and work on power lines are a few ex-
amples. When a person takes a job of this nature he is usually aware that
it will entail a certain amount of risk and his compensation often reflects
this fact. Therefore, it would be unreasonable for him to stop work and
expect not to be fired where his only reason for his work stoppage is a dan-
ger which a reasonable person would expect to face in this job. In Ana-
conda Aluminum, the Board pointed out that the job of working with mol-
ten metal, was "recognized and accepted by employees as inherently dan-
gerous."' 29  In other words, what is normally dangerous is not abnormally
dangerous.
Another extremely important factor is whether an effective grievance
procedure is available concerning safety disputes. A good example of this
is Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steel Workers of America.30 The workers
involved had been fired for a work stoppage over allegedly dangerous work-
ing conditions and were petitioning to be reinstated. The workers alleged
their firing was for striking over dangerous conditions, and therefore was an
unfair labor practice. The collective bargaining agreement provided not
only that grievances could be filed concerning safety disputes, but that the
employee filing such a grievance may cease the work which is allegedly un-
safe while the grievance is being processed. The employees here failed to
utilize the grievance procedure. The court held that utilizing the grievance
procedure was the proper route for such a dispute.31 Another court granted
an injunction where a union ignored a special safety committee set up by
the collective bargaining agreement for safety disputes and called a strike.
In granting the injunction against the strike, the court ignored the union's
contention that it had a defense under Section 502 because the strike was
caused by abnormally dangerous working conditions. The court merely said
the union had a duty to utilize the safety committee to solve the problem.82
28. Myers Industrial Electric, 177 NLRB 817 (1969). This decision involved a
complaint by electricians that they were forced to work without the aid of a second
electrician while handling high voltage wires.
29. 197 NLRB No. 51, 72 L.C. 31,263, 31,264 (1972). See also NLR.B v. Fruin-
Colnon Const. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 1964).
30. 464 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 568.
32. Peabody Coal Mine v. Local No. 7869, U.M.W., 360 F. Supp. 615, 620 (W.D.
Ark. 1973).
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A fourth factor in determining whether there was, in fact, an abnor-
mally dangerous working condition is the testimony or statements of disin-
terested third parties as to their opinion of whether such conditions pre-
vailed. In Philadelphia Marine Trade Association v. NLRB33 , a work stop-
page among a group of longshoremen resulted from the employer requiring
them to unload a ship with pallets for the cargo rather than a sling. Af-
ter .a short walkout, an arbitrator was called in 'by -the parties to determine
if this method was dangerous. He found it was dangerous. However, the
employer, who was apparently not bound 'by -the arbitrator's decision, ig-
nored this fact and ordered the men back to work. Upon their refusal to
return to work, he locked them out. The lockout was found to be an unfair
labor practice as retaliation for protected activity (i.e. a valid safety strike).
Other court and Board decisions have given great weight to the testimony
of disinterested witnesses, 34 the results of an inspection by the company
safety engineer 5 and a subsequent government inspection.3 6
A fifth factor is whether the condition or practice violates a safety stat-
ute or regulation. One court noted that a statute requiring certain devices
was evidence that the breakdown of such devices constituted a dangerous
working condition.3 7 The Board or a court has a limited amount of time
and expertise when they look into the question of whether abnormally dan-
gerous conditions prevailed. It is not unreasonable for them to rely upon
such safety statutes and regulations which presumably were based upon
more extensive investigation than is possible in a judicial hearing.
A number of other factors and sources of information have been util-
ized in Section 502 disputes. As in many other areas of judicial and quasi-
judicial endeavor, expert witnesses play an important part.3 8 The workers
own beliefs and reactions to the conditions are also important. In one Board
decision, it was pointed out that while some of the workers walked off the
job due to an extremely high dust content in the air, the vast majority of
the workers remained on the job, including all of those who were working
in the area of greatest dust concentration. 9  The fact that everyone walked
off the job due to the allegedly dangerous working condition is evidence that
33. 330 F.2d 492 (3rd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833 (1964).
34. NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Const. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1964); My-
ers Industrial Electric, 177 NLRB 817, 819 (1969).
35. Stop & Shop, Inc., 161 NLRB 75 (1966), affirmed, Machaby v. NLRB, 377
F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1967).
36. Myers Industrial Electric, 177 NLRB 817, 819 (1969).
37. NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
38. In NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied 357 U.S. 927 (1958), rehearing denied 358 U.S. 858 (1958), great weight was
given to the testimony of an industrial health expert who testified as to the probable ef-
fects of extremely high temperatures and humidity within the work area. See also, My-
ers InduStrial Electric, 177 NLRB 817, 819 (1969).
39. Curtis Mathes Manufacturing Co. 145 NLRB 473, 474 (1963).
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there was wide-spread 'belief of the seriousness of the condition. 40  The
availability of safety equipment 4' or failure of the striking employees to use
the safety equipment42 is a mitigating factor which weighs against the em-
ployees who claim they are being exposed to abnormal dangers.
In summary, the Board and the courts have utilized a number of fac-
tors or sources of information when determining whether abnormally danger-
ous working conditions prevailed at the time of the work stoppage. These
factors include whether it was a new danger, whether the job was normally
dangerous, whether an effective grievance procedure for safety issues was
available and was used, the testimony of disinterested witnesses, whether a
violation of a safety statute existed, testimony of expert witnesses, whether
the affected employees were unanamous in their expressed belief that the
conditions were dangerous, and the availability of safety equipment. This
list, of course, is not exhaustive of all the relevant factors which might be
considered in future cases, but it should serve as a useful guide to one at-
tempting to prove or disprove the existance of an abnormally dangerous con-
dition.
The Gateway case is not the only major recent development in the area
of safety disputes, however. There has been considerable activity in the
legislative arena concerning occupational safety which has culminated in The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 or OSHA.
43
THE IMPACT OF OSHA UPON SAFETY DISPUTES
Upon examination of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
two main questions may 'be asked. First, what impact does this Act have
on the law concerning the requirement for an abnormally dangerous working
condition, and secondly, does OSHA provide a viable alternative means of
settling safety disputes other than through strikes. Before facing these ques-
tions directly, a brief overview of the Act is necessary. OSHA was enacted
in order "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman . ..
safe and healthful working conditions . . . . 44 The Secretary of Labor
with the assistance of a National Advisory Committee was empowered to
set up mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to busi-
nesses that affect interstate commerce. 45 In order to enforce these stand-
ards, the Secretary was given .the power to conduct inspections of work sites
40. In NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 758, 759 (6th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied 357 U.S. 927 (1958), rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958), it was noted
that every one walked off the job due to excessive in-plant temperatures and that it was
certainly competent for laymen to testify to the conditions.
41. Myers Industrial Electric, 177 NLRB 817, 819 (1969).
42. Curtis Mathes Manufacturing Co., 145 NLRB 473, 474 (1963).
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1973).
44. Id. § 651(b).
45. Id. §§ 651(b)(3), 656(a)(2).
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without notice or search warrant.4 6 In addition, investigations of safety vio-
lations may be made and witnesses and evidence may be subpoenoed.
47
The employees themselves may also request an inspection which the Secre-
tary will order if he finds reasonable grounds to believe a violation is occur-
ring.48 If, upon inspection or investigation or both, the Secretary finds such
a violation is existant, he shall issue a citation describing such violation and
fix a reasonable time for the abatement of the violation.49 The employer
has fifteen days to contest this citation. If he does contest the citation, a
hearing will be held. If he fails to so contest the citation, it becomes a
final, non-appealable order.50
When examining OSHA for the impact it has upon the law concerning
strikes over safety issues, three main themes appear. The first is the philos-
ophy that safety disputes should be settled through peaceful means. This
would support the Gateway rule -and its policy underpinnings. The Act
creates machinery to settle safety disputes. This philosophy of peaceful
settlement of such disputes is clearly spelled out in the Act. The Act
notes that one of its purposes is to stimulate the creation or perfection
of existing in-plant programs designed to promote safe working conditions
and to build upon already existing employer-employee safety programs and
to encourage such joint employer-employee programs.51
On the other hand, the Act also seems to strengthen the position of
those who desire to justify work stoppages over safety issues or establish that
there actually are abnormally dangerous working conditions. The Act estab-
lishes a statutory duty on the part of employers -to "furnish . . . a place
of employment which [is] free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees
.... ,,52 It would not be unreasonable to argue that if the employer
breaches his statutory duty, then the employees may be justified in breach-
ing their contractual duty to respect a no-strike clause. The third theme
of the Act is the Act's direction that national safety standards be set
up.53 If these standards are violated, the employees may use this as evi-
dence that there were abnormally dangerous working conditions. As was
noted earlier 54, the violation of a safety statute is at least evidence that an
46. Id. § 657(a). However, this potential violation of the fourth amendment
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures is tempered by the Department of La-
bor's regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 which allows the employer to deny the inspector
entrance to the worksite.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 657(b).
48. Id. § 657(f)(1).
49. Id. § 658(a).
50. Id. § 659.
51. Id. § 651(b).
52. Id. § 654(a)(1).
53. Id. § 655.
54. See note 42 supra.
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abnormally dangerous working condition exists. As yet, there have been
no cases interpreting OSHA in relation to the right to strike over safety
issues, but the Act certainly provides ammunition for either side. At least
in the absence of an effective and safe method of settling a safety dispute
through a grievance procedure, it appears the employees position is strength-
ened by OSHA.
The other question is whether OSHA provides a viable alternative to
strikes over safety issues. Certainly, if those who would strike over safety
matters could just as effectively protect their safety by utilizing the adminis-
trative machinery of OSHA, this would negate the need for safety strikes.
Whether OSHA does perform such a function adequately depends upon the
speed and -the reliability with which the administrative machinery can act.
The reliability of the OSHA process -appears to be its strongest point. The
safety regulations under which it will operate are to be made up by experts
in the field of industrial safety, and both management and labor are to par-
ticipate in the National Advisory Committee which advises the Secretary of
Labor on such matters. 5 The Act provides for the training and develop-
ment of a professional corps of safety inspectors. 56 The Act also provides
for hearings where both sides may be represented, 57 allows both union and
management representatives to accompany the inspector,58 and gives em-
ployees the right to object to the time period allowed for the abatement of
the violation.59 This guarantee of participation 'by both sides will insure that
particular dangers, unique to that work area, will be brought out. The fact
that there is no safety standard yet promulgated which would cover the con-
dition in question, does not provide any loophole for the employer. Where
there is in fact a dangerous working condition the employer may be cited
for violating the general duty clause of the Act.
60
The other line of inquiry, in examining whether OSHA is a viable al-
ternative to the right to strike over safety issues, is the speed with which
the OSHA machinery can act. There are two major routes one can take
to clear up -a safety problem. The first one begins with inspections and in-
vestigations and culminates with the issuance of a citation to abate the work
hazard. When faced with a long term danger, such as exposure to harmful
materials which may effect the worker's health over the long run, this
55. 29 U.S.C. § 656 (1973).
56. Id. § 657.
57. Id. See also, id. § 659(c).
58. Id. § 657(e).
59. Id. § 659(c).
60. The report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970), explains the purpose of the general duty clause
and its relationship to the specific standards as follows: "The general duty clause in
this bill would not be a general substitute for reliance on standards, but would simply
enable the Secretary to ensure the protection of employees who are working under spe-
cial circumstances for which no standard has yet been adopted."
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method may be sufficient. It does not suffice where the worker is faced
with a new and immediate danger. The time taken to request an inspection,
have the inspection made and get a citation issued, which could, of course,
be contested, is too long if great bodily harm is imminent. The Act does
provide a much faster means to alleviate such dangers. It gives the Secre-
tary of Labor the power to seek an injunction to remove such condition or
prohibit exposure of employees to such conditions. The injunction should
be issued by a federal court if it finds that certain work conditions might
"reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm imme-
diately or before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated through
the enforcement procedures otherwise provided" by the Act.61 A temporary
restraining order may be issued without notice to the employer, but is lim-
ited to five days in duration. 62 If the Secretary arbitrarily fails to act, em-
ployees or their representatives may seek a writ of mandamus in a federal
court to compel the Secretary to act.63
This injunctive provision will go far in remedying the problem of immi-
nent dangers, but it is not a complete solution. Under the best of situations,
it would take ,at least twenty-four hours to have such an injunction issued.
In the case of an immediate threat of serious harm, this could be twenty-
four hours too late. The right to stop work in the face of such a threat
must be preserved, at least for the period of time that would be necessary
to get a hearing on the injunction action.
CONCLUSIONS
The Gateway rule, which requires that actual abnormally dangerous
working conditions be found before the NLRB or a court may protect those
who participated in a work stoppage from discharge or an injunction, puts
a harsh burden upon the workers. The workers will often be faced with
the unpleasant choice between working under dangerous conditions or taking
a chance of losing their jobs. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, however, provides at least a partial solution to the problem by giving
the employees a means of removing any such hazards which are actually
found to be dangerous. Better safety grievance procedures encouraged by
the Act may also go far to settle such safety disputes without recourse to
strikes or the necessity of endangering the employees. However these ad-
ministrative and in-plant remedies are not adequate to meet immediate dan-
gers. Therefore, the right to strike over safety issues should be preserved.
A compromise solution, which would partially satisfy both the employ-
ee's grievance of being exposed to serious occupational hazards 'and the em-
ployer's grievance of being subject to unjustified strikes, should be at-
61. 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1973).
62. Id. § 662(b).
63. Id. § 662(d).
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tempted. The Gateway rule should be overruled by an amendment to Sec-
tion 502 which would provide that work stoppages are protected activities
in the case of unfair labor practice actions where the employees in good
faith believed abnormally dangerous conditions prevailed. In the case of
actions to enjoin strikes, the Gateway rule that required an actual finding
of abnormally dangerous working conditions could be retained. This right
to strike in violation of a no-strike clause, however, should be limited by
a provision that the work stoppage would become unprotected activity if the
strikers or union had not, within a reasonable time, either utilized the local
grievance procedure, if available, or filed a petition with the Secretary of
Labor under OSHA. This latter provision would protect employers against
unwarranted or unreasonably long strikes over safety issues.
ROBERT C. STEPHENS
